Ten questions on fuzzy logic as a formal logic of consequence under vagueness are discussed; a problem of de nability of truth is formulated.
Ten questions
Before starting, let us quote from Parikh's 10] . He refers on a test where students assigned a numerical value to ten questions, among them the question \is President de Klerk an African?". He says: \If fuzzy logic says that there is an x such that President de Klerk is x-African, then it must tell us how to measure x and how to resolve the con ict between a person who says that de Klerk is .8-African and another the he is .2-African. It must also tell us how the correct value x is related to these two con icting reports and what it means to way that x is the correct value. If fuzzy logic does not answer these questions then its interest is only as a piece of pure mathematics and it must be judged by the same requirements of elegance and non-triviality, by which the rest of pure mathematics is judged." We shall comment on this quotation at the end of the present section. Question 1: In which contexts do we use vague predicates? There may be several, but I am fascinated just by one: We speak of a variable (real-valued or other) as if it were a binary property. We say \the soup is hot" and, mutatis mutandis, this is related to the present temperature of the soup. Surely we are uninterested in the exact temperature of the soup; but sometimes we are ready to assert the above sentence with more stress and at another time with less stress (and at another time we are not willing to assert it at all). This is apparent when we ask: \is the soup hot"? One can imagine plenty of possible answers, like \Oh yes, very much", \more or less", \not so much" etc. A similar case is if we have examples of colours (small coloured squares, each with the corresponding adjective: blue, green etc.). We get a new example and are asked: what colour is this? We may reduce this to the previous case by supposing some (unconscious) similarity measure; we take the most similar example and say: the new colour is (more or less) blue.
Question 2: What properties of vague predicates are important? In my opinion, the most important property is the comparative character: they may apply to a given object (individual) more or less (including absolutely yes and absolutely no). This leads to a comparative notion of truth: propositions may be more or less true. The same proposition (e.g. about soup) can have various truth values in various situations: it can be absolutely true, absolutely false, or something in between. (Now one may ask if there should be nitely or in nitely many truth values, if they are or are not linearly ordered etc; but let us not discuss this now.) As stressed in the Pe -Jetr discussion 6] this is common in sociological questionnaires. I have tried to ask philosophers if something of this kind can be found in European philosophy, and the answer was rather negative. Then by chance, I encountered the article by J. N. Martin 8] . The paper is extremely interesting since it concerns comparative notion of existence in neoplatonist philosophers (Plotinus). At one place he says \For our purposes here, however, the discussion should not restrict itself to existence and its direct transformations. There is another rich source of evidence in the concepts that Neoplatonists thought to be closely tied to existence. Indeed, the tradition is notorious in con ating with reality ideas that modern philosophers carefully distinguish: necessity, spirituality, moral goodness, beauty, substantiality, eternality, truth (!) -to list a few."
Martin stresses comparative use of the above ideas in natural language and \the fact that the comparatives that express these ideas are clearly associated with scalar adjectives." Even if this quotation does not seem to be a direct support for many-valued truth it does seem to document relatedness of the comparative notion of truth to Neoplatonist approach. For a non-philosopher (as the present author) it is just pleasing.
Mathematically it is important that Tarski's truth de nition immediately generalizes to many-valued predicate logic: given a structure L (lattice, possibly with additional operations) of truth values, one takes a crisp domain and interprets each predicate P by an L-valued relation r P . The satisfaction of atomic formulas generalizes immediately: The truth value of a formula P(x; : : :; y) in an L-structure M under the evaluation v of object variables is the value r P (v(x); : : :; v(y)). As some philosophers helped me to see, this is related to what they like to call the \dequotation scheme" (the sentence \it's snowing" is true i it's snowing): the truth value of \John is tall" is the result of applying the characteristic function of tallness to the object called John. truth function of conjunction is minimum then the truth degree of '^ just tells the minimum of the truth degrees of '; . If you take another truth function then clearly the truth degree of the formula tells another constraint. { Incidentally, the situation with (classical) quanti ers is simpler since it is always the case that 8 is interpreted as inf and 9 as sup. 2 Question 4: What are the limitations? I mean: what are the limitations of the truth-functional fuzzy logic? My main concern is: fuzzy logic is not poor man's probability: it is not a theory of belief into something which is crisp by itself. Here I must ask about Parikh's de Klerk example 10]. What did the test students do? How were they instructed? Was \be an African" interpreted as a vague notion, so that the question is how much it is true that de Klerk is an African or as a thing which is either true or false but the precise de nition is unknown so that the question is how much I believe (bet, nd probable) that de Klerk satis es this (unknown but precise) de nition? The former is fuzziness, the latter beliefs. And the fact that beliefs are not truth functional is notoriously known: For crisp properties '; , the probability P('^ ) of '^ is not a function of P('); P( ). Similarly for possibility ('^ ). Furthermore, P(' _ ) is not a function of P('); P( ); similarly for necessity N(' _ ).
(For example if P(') = P( ) = 0:5 then P('^ ) can be any number from 0; 1]:) I always add: fuzziness does not concern beliefs on crisp things but of course we may make fuzzy statements on probabilities, e.g. saying that the probability of something is high.
Question 5: What is true? Formally, we have to reply as in classical logic: true in which interpretation of the language? Formulas are not just true or false; their truth value depends on the interpretation chosen (model, relational structure). In fuzzy logic, the question is, what is the truth degree of a given formula in a given fuzzy structure (described above). Now how does this relate to natural language? Is there something like the \real" interpretation (actual possible world)? This question is asked about the classical logic and about the fuzzy logic as well -and for both the answer is outside the scope of logic. Where are fuzzy structures from? We may reject the question saying that the similar question, where are crisp structures from, would have to be asked also. But I think that the following approach may be helpful: The \reality" (just starting structure) is crisp of the form hM; f 1 ; : : :; f n i where each f i maps some power M n into a domain D i . We are not interested in crisp values, but have, for each i, a fuzzy subset i of D i (e.g. i is the fuzzy subset of big elements of D i ). Thus in fact we want to refer to the derived structure hM; r 1 ; : : :i where r i (x) = i (f i (x)). This structure is our interpretation of the predicate language of our fuzzy logic. Truth degrees of formulas are de ned. 2 There are some alternative de nitions of the semantics of quanti ers but we shall not discuss them. (brain) . Not that I can be conscious about the values; but in some sense as an oracle. I think that this is similar to subjective probabilities. I cannot say: \my subjective probability that I shall survive till tomorrow is 0.987654321", but I can say \my subjective probability of that I shall survive till tomorrow is rather big". Given this, I am entitled to say things that are as true as possible, su ciently true. This is again fuzzy, but the life is fuzzy. Please understand me properly: this is surely not advocating that we may say half-truths, cheat etc. But if John says to Mary \I love you" and he says this as the best expression of what he indeed feels, i.e. he is fully honest, cannot you imagine a slightly di erent situation in which his sentence would be still more true? Again by the way: if he says \I love you, and I love you, and I love you", I guess that his truth function of \and" is non-idempotent (even if he does not care about that).
Admittedly, there are very few papers attempting to present some observationbased foundation to membership functions (Paris's 12] is one of them.) Such analyses are clearly interesting but I nd the \oracle" approach viable.
Question 7: How do we communicate? Honestly: I do not know. This question surely does not concern logic. My primitive picture is: When speaking with you, rst it is not clear if we speak about the same (basic, crisp) model. But I suppose we intend to do that, so let us suppose we do. Second, it is to be expected that my and your use of fuzzy words \heavy" is not the same (as Parikh repeatedly stresses); but I think that there are some principles that we share (I assume that it is not the case that you consider people of even height in cm to be big and those of odd height not big). Thus I (very fuzzily) imagine a conversation as a game (Parikh's word) in which both my and your meaning of fuzzy words may change: the cooperative conversation may (possibly) be imagined as a kind of tuning the characteristic functions of fuzzy sets involved. By the way, tuning the characteristic functions is a very important part of building a fuzzy controller: here the good semantics is that which makes the controller to behave well. To use Parikh's example: we have a pot that I think is blue and my wife thinks it is rather green. De nitely this has changed my understanding of blue and green: I have to accept that the colour of the pot is green in some not too small positive degree (since my wife has called it green). Question 8. Is fuzzy logic helpful with the Sorites paradox? I think it is: The truth degree of being bald gradually changes from 1 to 0. But one has to be careful: One has to work with Lukasiewicz implication (given by a nilpotent conjunction) and its Pavelka-style extension. Then a theory assuming that { having 10000 hairs implies not being bald] is absolutely true, { having 0 hairs implies being bald] is absolutely true and { loosing one hair does not make a non-bald man bald] is 0.9999-true is consistent (modulo some obvious formalization).
Vop enka's alternative set theory deserves mention here: This is, as I have often stressed, a completely di erent approach, Boolean (two-valued), but with restricted induction. The interested reader may consult 14].
Question 9: How do we make decisions? I consider this question to be a promising research program (and have no satisfactory answer). First note that the principle of fuzzy control may be viewed as a possible model of decision making under vagueness. Second, there exists literature on decision making under fuzziness that is hoped to be helpful in answering the present question. Question 10: What do we gain by accepting fuzzy logic? We cannot escape the fact that di erent people assign di erent truth values to the same proposition. We do gain a comparative theory of truth. I stress \comparative", not numerical: the semantics is over arbitrary regular residuated lattices (called also BL-algebras) and it is a mathematical result that, for all three famous propositional logics, tautologies over all corresponding lattices 3 equal to tautologies over just one lattice, namely that of truth values over 0,1]. As an example let us make it precise for Lukasiewicz propositional logic. The corresponding class of algebras is that of MV -algebras: Each MV -algebra can be taken as the truth set of Lukasiewicz logic; not each MV -algebra is linearly ordered. The standard MV -algebra is the real interval 0; 1] with the truth functions of Lukasiewicz logic. The completeness theorem says that the following three things are mutually equivalent, for each formula ': (i) ' is provable in Lukasiewicz logic, (ii) ' is a tautology over each MV -algebra L, i.e. has value 1 under each evaluation of propositional variables by elements of L, (iii) ') is a tautology over the standard MV -algebra. Similar completeness theorems hold for G odel logic and product logic. For predicate calculi the situation is more delicate; we do not go into details here.
What is a comparative theory of truth good for? (Besides being beautiful mathematics.) Who knows? In the next section we shall discuss the problem of (un)de nability of (possibly many-valued) truth predicate in arithmetic developed inside fuzzy logic. The problem seems very natural and, in my opinion, illustrates well the fact that fuzzy logic is not just some \applied logic" but may bring new light to classical logical problems and thus may be well classi ed as \philosophical logic" similarly as modal logics etc. On the other hand, fuzzy logic does have applications. What can be expected from our theoretical analysis? Fuzzy control people should learn to express themselves in a logically educated way and stop speaking logical nonsense. Linguists are not interested in truth (I was told) but are interested in vagueness; they might nd something from fuzzy semantics useful. No doubt, fuzzy logic in the broad sense is rather popular; we logicians can o er it exact foundations.
Concluding remark. Admittedly, there have been numerous other summaries of fuzzy logic. Ours has been written from the perspective of fully developed formal mathematical (symbolic) systems of fuzzy logic ( 5] ). We do have satisfactory foundations and fuzzy logic stands well the \request of elegance and non-triviality". On the other hand, our answers should show that systems of symbolic many-valued logic discussed here are not only interesting fully-edged formal systems but serve as reasonable formalization of deduction under vagueness. I hope to have shown that the truth value of a formula (atomic like \de Klerk is an African" or compound) is given by an interpretation (model) of the language in question plus by Tarski-like truth de nition exactly as in classical logic; and that overcoming disagreement of two (or more) persons on the truith value of a formula may be well understood as mutual smooth tuning their (personal, subjective) interpretations. The underlying \reality" (if any) may be even thought to be crisp, as we have indicated. Particular precise (\correct") truth values are of lesser importance; what matters are various monotonicities, shapes of characteristic functions of fuzzy sets used, just the comparative characteristics, and the fact that deduction is truth preserving: given bounds for truth degrees of axioms it gives bounds for truth degrees of conclusions. 4 Thus in my opinion Parikh's demands (quoted above) have to be taken cum grano salis. The main intuitive appeal of fuzzy logic is, to repeat once more, in its comparative notion of truth. Needless to say, Parikh's criticism has been extremely inspiring and I am grateful for it. 2 The problem of unde nability of truth. ' Tr(') for each closed formula '. The resulting theory TR is contradictory due to the liar paradox: using G odel's diagonal lemma, let be such that TR` :Tr( ). Then TR` : which is inconsistent (in Boolean logic).
Our problem is: What happens in many-valued logic? We may express the condition that a predicate is crisp as follows:
Crisp(A) (8x; y)(A(x; y) _ :A(x; y)) Postulate Crisp(A) and analogously Crisp(=); Crisp(S); Crisp(B). PA L is the theory over Lukasiewicz predicate logic L8 with the above crispness axioms and axioms of PA. I nd this to be a exciting problem. 5 Note that the use of Lukasiewicz logic 5 Added July 1997: a solution will appear in a joint paper of H ajek, Paris and is crucial; over other important logics (G odel logic, product logic) the corresponding theory is inconsistent since : is refutable in them.
